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This paper aims to analyze the role of a branch of a Japanese bank in the internationals 
financial centers and its change during the Interwar period. Branches of international 
exchange banks generally buy bills for goods exported from where they exist, to 
collect bills for goods imported to where they exist, and to transfer funds with other 
branches. In addition to these “ordinary” businesses branches in the international 
financial centers raise funds by selling bills there or by borrowing money from other 
banks, to makes investments for securing reserves, and to advise letters of credit issued 
by large banks there. This paper sheds light on these activities of the Yokohama Specie 
Bank, which was the largest international exchange bank in Japan before the Second 
World War and shows that branches in London and New York facilitated the flow of 
funds within the bank. The Interwar period saw significant change in international 
money flow as New York grew to an international financial center, which was as 
important as London and also saw the Great Depression and international conflicts 
after that. This paper analyzes how businesses of the two branches changed in order to 
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After the 1870s international capital flows increased significantly and financial centers 
in the world were integrated more closely by the much faster transmission of 
information. The City of London became the hub of international financial relations in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. The period between the 1870s and the First 
World War was a “classic” period of the City of London as the global financial center. 
The City of London provided the commercial credit necessary to finance not only 
British exports and imports but also those of countries other than Britain. As only bills 
accepted by merchant bankers or well-known joint stock banks in London were 
discounted by bill brokers, banks and merchants outside Britain were eager to transact 
with London bankers. Then, 60 percent of prime bills outstanding in London were 
finance bills by 1913; therefore, the City of London not only provided international 
trade finance but played an important role for the maintenance of international 
finance.
1 In order to do foreign exchange business it was vital to have access to the 
London money markets; thus foreign banks such as Crédit Lyonnais and Deutsche 
Bank began to establish London offices from around 1870, though British overseas 
banks had London offices from the period before 1870. By 1913 the number of foreign 
banks’ London offices rose to about thirty (Nishimura, 1971; Michie, 1992; Cassis, 
2006). 
During the First World War, however, London lost the dominant position as 
the world financial center and New York increased its importance greatly. With the 
passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 member banks of the Federal Reserve 
System became able to accept time bills of exchange and the New York acceptance 
market began to take shape (Beckhart, 1932; Madden and Nadler, 1935). The New 
York acceptance market, however, did not replace the London Market. Although New 
York surpassed London as the world’s capital market, London retained the advantage 
in financing international trade. In the 1930s over two-thirds of the world’s banks had 
an office, an agent or a correspondent bank in London (Merrett, 1995; Michie, 2005; 
Cassis, 2006). Many foreign banks established their agencies or affiliated companies in 
the United States, especially in New York, but its exact number is unknown. Two 
                                                        
1  A large amount of bonds were issued on the London capital market, but capital 
issuance is not analyzed in this paper. For capital issuance, especially for bond 
issuance of the Japanese government, see Suzuki (1994).   3
international financial centers co-existed between the two world wars. 
By 1929 six Japanese banks had foreign offices: the Yokohama Specie Bank 
(hereafter referred to as YSB) had 37, the Bank of Chosen 19, the Bank of Taiwan 14, 
the Sumitomo Bank 8, the Mitsui Bank 6, and the Mitsubishi Bank 3. The former three 
banks had been established under special legislations and the latter three banks were 
among the largest ordinary banks at that time. Sixty-four offices out of eighty-seven 
offices were located in China, Manchuria, India, Southeast Asia, and Australia, but all 
six banks had a New York office and five banks except for the Bank of Chosen had a 
London office (Itoh, 1979). This figure suggests that the offices in London and New 
York played an important role for their international businesses. This paper aims to 
analyze the activities of London and New York offices of the YSB in the interwar 
period. Yamazaki (1992) has analyzed the activities of both branches in 1930 and 1931 
and Taira (1993, 1997) did so for the years after 1937. They showed that (1) the YSB 
bought and sold bills and telegraphic transfers (T.T.) and collected and paid bills and 
T.T.s and this was its main business; (2) it discounted a large amount of bills on the 
London and New York markets and borrowed funds from the top-ranking banks there 
in order to obtain the necessary funds; (3) After the outbreak of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War in 1937 the transactions on the both markets markedly contracted. 
This paper will analyze the relationship between the YSB’s exchange transactions and 
its fund raising on both markets more closely, examine the YSB’s acceptance business 
which has been rarely studied, and will show that the credibility of the bank on the 
markets were seriously affected after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931. 
In the next section the overall business of the bank is briefly described. In sections 3 
and 4 the activities of the offices in London and New York will be analyzed and the 
final section concludes this paper. 
 
2. Exchange Business of the YSB 
 
When Japan opened its ports to the world in 1859 almost all international trade was 
conducted through foreign merchants, who came from Europe, the United States, 
China, and other countries. After the offices of three Western banks were established in 
1863 they came to finance the Japanese foreign trade, though wealthy merchants 
imported or exported commodities with their own funds (Tamaki, 1995, 17). Japanese 
merchants soon began to participate in foreign trades. The ratio of the amount of 
Japanese imports and exports conducted by Japanese merchants to the total amount of 
Japanese international trade began to rise, and it reached about a half around the 
outbreak of the First World War. Japanese merchants or the Japanese government had 
to depend entirely on the Western banks for their international money transactions until 
the YSB (established in Yokohama in 1880) began foreign exchange business in 1882. 
With the issuance of the Yokohama Specie Bank Ordinance of 1887 and its revision in   4
1889 the YSB was reorganized as an exchange bank, obtained special supports from 
the government and the Bank of Japan, and was under a stricter control of the financial 
authorities than the ordinary banks. The YSB bought bills drawn by foreign merchants 
as well as those drawn by the Japanese. In 1887 about a fifth of the Japanese 
international trade was financed by the YSB and the figure rose to 45 percent by 1911 
(Ishii, 1994). The share of foreign banks in the finance of the Japanese exports and 
imports decreased drastically during the First World War and that of the Japanese 
banks other than the YSB also increased. Due to growing competition with Japanese 
ordinary banks such as the Mitsui Bank and the Bank of Taiwan, the share of the YSB 
in the finance of Japanese international trade declined by one tenth in the 1920s, 
though it rose again to the almost the same figure as that in the 1910s after the Great 
Depression due to the increased control over the foreign exchange market by the 
financial authorities (Itoh, 1989). 
  With the change in the functions of international financial centers the internal 
flow of funds of the YSB also experienced changes. Japan exported silk to the United 
States and cotton goods to China, Southeast Asia, and India; and imported raw cotton 
from the United States and India, iron and steel from India and Europe, wool from 
Australia, and machinery from the United States and Europe. The internal flow of 
funds within the YSB was similar to the flow of Japanese international trade as shown 
in Figure 1. Some important differences, however, existed. Silk was the largest export 
product of Japan until the Great Depression and more than half of Japanese exported 
silk was shipped to the United States around 1890 and this ratio increased to four fifths 
by 1915. In the nineteenth century Japanese merchants drew bills on New York for 
their silk exported to the United States. However, they began to draw bills on London 
for silk exported to the United States around the turn of the century. The ratio of bills 
on London rose to two thirds just before the First World War (Ishii, 1994). The London 
Branch of the YSB played an important role for the international settlement (Yokouchi, 
1984). After the outbreak of the First World War the Japanese merchants began to draw 
bills on New York again for silk exported to the United States. With the increase and 
decrease in bills on London the circulation of funds within the YSB changed. In 1913 
the flow of funds through the United States was very small in comparison with that in 
1903, but it grew significantly by 1925. In addition to the London Branch the New 
York Agency became a world financial hub within the YSB in the 1920s. 
 
Figure 1 near here 
 
  The interwar period witnessed the increase in international money flow due to 
the decrease in the cost of money transfers. Foreign exchange rates fluctuated more 
widely than before 1914 and foreign exchange markets grew rapidly in London and 
New York (Kynaston, 2000, 99-101; Madden and Nadler, 1935, 214). Overdrafts and   5
telegraphic transfers began to replace trade bills (Battilossi, 2000). The YSB not only 
bought and collected bills for exports and imports but also transferred money globally 
for their fund adjustment among offices and for making profits from the exchange and 
the interest arbitrage. The ratio of telegraphic transfers to the total amount of transfers 
with bills and by cable at the YSB increased in the interwar period as shown Figure 2. 
The offices in London and New York were also important from the viewpoint of 
international fund transfers. 
 
Figure 2 near here 
 
As the London and New York offices discounted their bills on the markets and 
borrowed funds from banks, the outstanding amounts of bills discounted and of 
borrowings were very large, though the amount of funds raised in Japan was naturally 
the largest as shown in Table 1. Discounting and borrowing were done on the London 
money market before the First World War, but discounting and borrowing on the New 
York money market increased markedly as the New York markets grew. On the other 
hand, large amounts of funds were deposited at banks in London and New York. The 
total outstanding amount of deposits at banks on the both markets was larger than that 
deposited at banks in Japan. These figures suggest that the activities of the offices in 
London and New York were very active in the interwar period and they are analyzed in 
the following sections.   
 
Table 1 near here 
 
3. The Activities of the London Branch 
 
The YSB’s London Branch purchased bills drawn for goods exported from Britain 
(export bills) and collected bills representing goods imported to Britain (import bills).
2 
As the details of bills for 1935 are available, London branch’s business in this year can 
be more closely examined.
3  The branch bought export bills of  ₤5.2 m., of which  ₤4.0 
m. were interest bills denominated in pound sterling. Pound sterling was an 
international currency in the middle of the 1930s. Principal export goods for which 
bills were drawn were as follows: iron and other metals (₤0.7 m.), paper and pulp (₤0.4 
m.), woolens (₤0.3 m.), cereals (₤0.3 m.), chemicals (₤0.3 m.), and machinery (₤0.2 
                                                        
2  Trades not to or not from Britain are supposed to be included in figures for export 
and import bills, but no breakdown is available. This note applies to the business of the 
New York Agency. 
3  Yokohama Shokin Ginko maikuro firumu ban [Microfilms of YSB Archives, 
hereafter referred to as MYSBA], Dai 3 ki [Third Series] Reel 0165, koma [exposure] 
No. 0180-0205.   6
m.). As Japan was becoming an industrialized country, the value of machinery was not 
so large and smaller than that of woolens, most of which are supposed to have been 
shipped from Australia to Japan. In the same year the branch collected import bills of 
₤37.1 m., of which ₤36.5 m. were bills receivable. It is natural that almost all import 
bills were denominated in pound sterling. Principal imported goods represented by 
bills were as follows: cotton and cotton goods (₤10.6 m.), silver and other metals (₤6.0 
m.), green peas and beans (₤3.1 m.), rubber goods (₤3.0 m.), cereals (₤1.6 m.), and silk 
goods (₤1.2 m.). In the 1930s the British Empire imported a large amount of cotton 
goods from Japan and its amount was much larger than that of silk.
4  
  For the international trade two kinds of bills were drawn: bills under bank 
credit and trade bills. For the latter bills an office of the YSB located in a place where 
an importer of some goods lived instructed another office to buy a trade bill drawn by 
an exporter of the goods on the importer. This instruction is called a letter of 
instruction. In addition to bills drawn on L/C and letters of instruction the YSB 
purchased trade bills of very creditworthy trading companies such as the Mitsui & Co. 
and the Mitsubishi Corporation which were drawn on the trading company’s overseas 
offices and those were called “house bills.” The amount of bills under bank credit was 
much larger than those under letters of instruction as shown in Table 2. The amount of 
bills under bank credit gradually declined in the 1920s with the decrease of the world 
trade and fell down sharply in 1927. A financial crisis broke out in Japan in 1927 and 
the Suzuki Trading Co., which was a large customer of the YSB and had drawn bills 
under credit, went bankrupt. Moreover, after the failure of the Suzuki Trading Co. the 
Mitsui & Co. and the Mitsubishi Corporation increased their transactions to fill the 
void left by the collapse and the house bills bought by the YSB increased. The 
estimated ratio of bills accepted by banks other than the YSB to the total amount of 
bills receivable and interest bills receivable was 43 percent at the end of 1931 and 31 
percent at the end of 1936 and the ratio accepted by the YSB was 21 percent and 8 
percent respectively.
5 London acceptance became less important gradually from the 
1920s but its importance was still undisputed in the 1930s. The ratio of bills under 
bank credit to the total amount of bills and interest bills bought was 14 percent at the 
end of 1931 and 4 percent at the end of 1936. The reason why the ratio was low for 
                                                        
4  The total amount of clean bills was  ₤5.0 m. (₤2.0 m. of export bills and  ₤3.0 m. of 
import bills) and its ratio to the total amount of export and import bills was only 12 
percent. This percentage is much smaller than 60 percent of British average in 1913. 
The rise in telegraphic transfers seems to have affected the decline of clean bills. 
5  The ratios were estimated from the outstanding amounts at the end of each year. A 
bill under bank credit is regarded as a bill of which acceptor was a bank. Most bills of 
which acceptor was the YSB seem to have been drawn on letters of instruction.   
MYSBA, Dai 2 ki [Second Series] Reel 0123, No. 0573-0905; Reel 0132, No. 
0576-0965.   7
export bills is analyzed in the next section. 
 
Table 2 near here 
 
  Letters of credit were issued by bankers, who had established their reputation 
on the London money market. Table 3 shows the names of the ten largest issuers of the 
letters of credit advised through the YSB’s London Branch and their outstanding 
amounts in June 1922. Table 4 shows the largest ten bankers in Monthly Balance Sheet 
of Special Acceptors, Bills Receivable for the end of years 1931 and 1936.
6  Out of the 
ten bankers seven were merchant banks in 1922, one in 1931, and one in 1936. The 
merchant bankers were replaced by clearing banks, colonial banks, and foreign banks, 
though the Hambro’s Bank was ranked first in 1936. Facing the competition from 
clearing banks the heyday of merchant banking had come to an end during the First 
World War and merchant bankers’ share in the acceptance business declined in the 
interwar period (Chapman, 1984; Cassis, 2006, 167). Table 3 and 4 indicate the decline 
of merchant bankers as acceptors of bills for the YSB, though in the case of the YSB 
the decline was sharper than the general trend. 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 near here 
 
In 1935 the amount of import bills was seven times as much as that of export 
bills. Also between 1924 and 1926 the amount of import bills was twice as much as 
that of export bills.
7 This does not mean that the London Branch was rich in cash. In 
addition to buying (export) bills and collecting (import) bills, it sold demand drafts and 
T.T.s and paid bills and T.T.s as shown in Table 5. Although the table is incomplete, it 
seems useful in estimating the cash flow of the branch. The branch paid a large amount 
of T.T. and this means that other branches sold T.T.s on London in order to raise funds. 
At the same time the branch sold demand drafts and T.T.s to raise funds. The total 
amount of bills and T.T.s paid and demand drafts and T.T.s sold (business not directly 
related to exports and imports) was almost equal to the total amount of collected bills 
and T.T.s receivables and bills and T.T.s bought (business directly related to exports 
and imports), therefore the former was as important as the latter. In this way the branch 
functioned within the global network of the YSB. In addition to internal fund transfers 
the branch raised funds and invested money on the London money market. Using the 
resources and facilities of the London market it was able to function as a hub of the 
YSB’s network. 
 
                                                        
6  The meaning of special acceptors is not given. 
7  MYSBA, Second Series, Reel 0114, No. 1049-1061.   8
Table 5 near here 
 
In order to do business in London the branch was at first necessary to open an 
account at a British bank. When the YSB’s London Sub-branch was established in 
1881 (promoted to a branch in 1884) it opened a current account at the Alliance Bank 
with an introduction from Alexander A. Shand, who had worked for the Ministry of 
Finance of Japan and was working for the Alliance Bank at that time. The Alliance 
Bank also agreed to accept bills drawn by the YSB and to lend money to the London 
Sub-branch against bills receivable (Yokohama Shokin Ginko, 1986, 115; Ishii, 2002, 
119). The YSB made similar contracts with the London Joint Stock Bank in 1885 and 
with the Union Bank of London in 1886. Moreover, the YSB also made a similar 
contract with the Lloyds Bank in 1912 and with the Barclays Bank in 1934. The 
Alliance Bank merged with the Westminster Bank; the London Joint Stock Bank 
amalgamated with the Midland Bank; and the Union Bank of London merged with the 
National Provincial Bank; thus the YSB had accounts at all the “Big Five” banks. In 
addition to clearing banks the YSB opened a current account at the Bank of England in 
1896, though it was not allowed to borrow money from the central bank (Tokyo Ginko, 
1981, 52, 79, and 84; Tokyo Ginko, 1982, 128; Tamaki, 1990). The total amount of 
facilities provided by British clearing banks increased steadily: ₤2 m. in 1922, ₤4.15 
m. in 1923,  ₤4.5 m. in 1929, and  ₤5 m. in 1937, although the amounts offered by each 
bank fluctuated (for example, between 1929 and 1937, the amount provided by the 
Westminster Bank increased from ₤500,000 to ₤2,000,000 but the amount by the 
Lloyds Bank decreased from ₤2,000,000 to only ₤100,000).
8 Moreover, when the 
YSB made a contract with the Barclays Bank, the latter first proposed simply to open 
an account to the former. The branch borrowed ₤5,550,000 from the four clearing 
banks at the end of 1929 (Yamazaki, 1988). In the 1920s the YSB has already achieved 
credibility, thus it raised a large amount of funds on the London money market.   
  In addition to borrowings from the British banks the YSB London Branch sold 
bills to discount houses to raise funds. In 1898, however, the branch was still unable to 
do business with the first class discount houses. Korekiyo Takahashi, the then vice 
president of the YSB, requested the government to deposit money with the bank and to 
allow it to make loans to the first class discount houses in London (Uetsuka, 1976, 
126). It is unclear when this request was granted but one-million-pound loan was made 
with governmental funds in 1919 and 1921.
9 In 1929 the branch made loans of ₤
                                                        
8  MYSBA, Dai 1 ki [First Series] Reel L013, No. 0285-0268; Tokyo Ginko (1981, 
415); MYSBA, First Series, Reel L014, No. 0866-0874; “Kamihanki chu tegata 
saiwaribiki gaikyo (29/071937) [A survey on bill rediscounting in the first half year, 
dated 29 June 1937], ” US National Archives, RG 131.3.4., YSB Box 8. 
9  MYSBA, First Series, Reel L011, No. 0313-0318; MYSBA, Second Series, Reel 
0115, No. 0449-0545.   9
600,000 with governmental funds and loans of ₤150,000 with its own funds. At the 
same time the branch discounted bills of ₤2,878,895 as shown in Table 6. A large 
amount of bills were purchased by houses to which the bank made loans of  ₤50,000 or 
more. Governmental fund loans were effective to keep in “touch” with the money 
market. Moreover, the relationship with the discount houses was very stable. In 1929 
the YSB made loans to the same thirteen houses to which it had made loans with 
government funds in 1921.
10 Allen, Harvey & Ross, Cater & Co. and some other 
discount houses listed on Table 6 bought YSB bills in 1935 (Yamazaki, 1988). 
 
Table 6 near here 
 
The YSB established important connections with the discount houses in 
London. It discounted not only bills accepted by the London bankers but also sold 
house bills on the market. The YSB usually made up parcels of bills following the 
custom of the money market (Madden and Nadler, 1935, 273). In these parcels house 
bills were included but their amount was up to 10 percent of the total value of the 
parcel. The discount rate of a house bill was usually higher than that of a bank bill, but 
a parcel of bills (including house bills) of the YSB was discounted at a “fine rate” in 
the 1920s like other banks’ parcels.
11 This suggests that the London Branch had 
almost the same credit rating with other foreign agencies in London. In 1936 house 
bills endorsed by the YSB were discounted at 0.625 to 0.6875 percent, while house 
bills endorsed by other Japanese banks were discounted at 0.75 to 0.875 percent. The 
YSB had a better credit rating than other Japanese banks.
12  
After the 2/26 Incident in February 1936 and the Second Sino-Japanese War in 
July 1937 British banks became cautious about Japanese banks. Although fine bills 
(accepted by British banks) were discounted at 0.53125 percent and agency bills 
(accepted by foreign agencies) at 0.5625 percent in the first half of 1937, parcels of 
bills made up by the YSB, which included 20 percent of bills accepted by it or house 
bills, were discounted at 0.6875 percent.
13 That is the YSB faced a “Japan premium” 
at this time. In August 1937 London bankers began to cut down the amount of the 
facilities provided to the YSB. Moreover, it became impossible to discount bill parcels 
                                                        
10  MYSBA, Second Series, Reel 0115, No. 0449-0545. 
11  MYSBA, First Series, Reel L013, No. 1105-1107; MYSBA, Second Series, Reel 
0114, No. 1049-1061; MYSBA, First Series, Reel L014, No. 0985-1024. 
12  “Zenhanki toten toritate tegata narabini tegata waribiki ni tsuite, Rondon shiten 
(27/08/1936) [On bills receivable and discounted bills of this branch in the previous 
half year, London Branch, dated 27 August 1936],” US National Archives, RG 131.3.4, 
YSB Box 8. 
13  “Kamihanki chu tegata saiwaribiki gaikyo (29/071937) [A survey on bill 
rediscounting in the first half year, dated 29 June 1937], ” cited in note 8.   10
which included house bills or bills accepted by it. The activities of the branch 
continued to diminish in the following years and its assets were finally frozen when 
Japan declared war against Britain in December 1941 (Taira, 1997). 
 
4. The Activities of the New York Agency 
 
The New York Agency was established in 1880 and opened a current account at the 
National Park Bank of New York with an introduction from the Japanese consul in 
New York (Yokohama Shokin Ginko, 1986, 109). By 1922 the agency was provided 
facilities of $26.1 million by the following five banks: the Chase National Bank, the 
National City Bank of New York, the National Park Bank of New York, the National 
Bank of Commerce in New York, and the First National Bank, New York. The amount 
was raised to $33.0 million in 1923 (Tokyo Ginko, 1981, 416).
14 By April 1930 the 
Bankers Trust Co., the Bank of the Manhattan Co., and the Irving Trust Company were 
added to the list (in 1929 the National Bank of Commerce in New York merged with 
the Guaranty Trust Co. of New York and the National Park Bank of New York was 
absorbed by the Chase National Bank, thus the number of banks at which the YSB had 
an account was seven) but the amount of facilities was reduced to $24.5 million.
15  
The New York Agency’s two main businesses were buying export bills and 
collecting import bills just as the London Branch. In the second half of 1932 the 
agency bought export bills of $27.1 m., of which $21.9 m. (81 percent) were bills 
drawn for raw cotton export. In the same half year it collected import bills of $36.6 m., 
of which $28.2 m. (77 percent) were bills for raw silk.
16 Most import bills were 
denominated in dollars and bills for exporting raw cotton were denominated in yen, 
though bills for exporting machinery were denominated in dollars. The ratio of interest 
bills bought to the total amount of bills bought plus interest bills bought was 25 percent 
in the second half of 1931 and 20 percent in the second half of 1936.
17  The limited use 
of interest bills indicates the limits of the dollar as an international currency in 
comparison with the pound sterling. Anyway, this agency’s business relating to exports 
and imports can be accounted for by only two goods: raw cotton and raw silk. Let us 
first take up the bills for importing silk.
18  
                                                        
14 MYSBA,  First  Series, Reel L013, No. 0269-0290. 
15  MYSBA, First Series, Reel Lo15, No. 0059-0068. The amount of $24.5 m. was a 
figure of on-demand loans. In addition to on-demand loans the agency had agreements 
with nineteen banks on acceptance against export bills and its total amount was $22.75 
million. J. P. Morgan & Co. allowed the YSB to open an account in December 1930. 
16  MYSBA, Third Series, Reel 0160, No. 0767-0781. 
17  MYSBA, Second Series, Reel 0123, No. 0268-0496; Reel 0132, No. 0317-0574. 
18  The ratio of bills for silk declined to 60% and that of raw cotton to 30% by 1937. 
The ratio of raw cotton fell down sharply from 72% in 1936 because of restriction on   11
Japanese merchants exporting silk to the United States drew bills either on 
American bankers or on importers (trade bills) and the ratio of the former to the total of 
the two kinds of bills was 30 to 40 percent in the 1920s (Ishii, 1988). The estimated 
ratio of bills under bank credit to the total amount of bills receivable and interest bills 
receivable was 54 percent at the end of 1931 and 41 percent at the end of 1936. The 
YSB tried to raise the ratio from the 1920s because too high ratio of house bills was 
very risky and these efforts bore fruit (the ratio of bills accepted by it was negligible in 
New York). In 1927 the YSB Head Office advised letters of credit issued by other 
banks of $55.2 m. by cable and the ten largest issuers are indicated on Table 7. The 
Chase National Bank, the National City Bank and the National Bank of Commerce in 
New York were banks at which the YSB had accounts and the American Exchange 
Irving Trust allowed the YSB to open accounts in 1930. The Brown Brothers was an 
affiliated company of the Brown Shipley of London and the Equitable Eastern Banking 
Corporation, which had some branches in China, was an affiliated company of the 
Equitable Trust Company. Famous banks, banks with business relationship with the 
YSB, and banks which had competitive edges in the Far Eastern business are listed on 
Table 7. Bills accepted by banks, which had a second class credit rating (e.g. the 
Philadelphia-Girard National Bank on Table 7), constituted only about 10 percent of 
the bills under bank credit. 
 
Table 7 near here 
 
The YSB did not buy all the bills drawn on credit advised through it because a 
portion of such letters of credit was open (unrestricted). In 1927 the YSB purchased 
bills of $34 million out of bills of $55 million advised through it. As every merchant 
did not draw bills up to the amount of credit provided by banks, the bank appears to 
have purchased about 70 percent of bills advised though it. In actual fact the bank 
purchased bills drawn on credits advised through other banks or credits which were on 
the way to Japan and its amount in 1927 was $23 million. Advising letters of credit 
issued by American bankers was an important but not a crucial business to obtain 
customers. 
Acceptance was utilized also for export bills. In 1922 the YSB agreed with the 
International Acceptance Bank (hereafter referred as IAB), which was a specialized 
acceptance corporation established in 1921 (Beckhart, 1932, 303), that the YSB could 
draw bills on the IAB at ninety days sight against bills bought by the YSB. Such a kind 
of acceptance business seems to have been already done in 1919, but the date that the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
importing raw cotton imposed by the Japanese government in this year and a sudden 
increase in exports of iron and steel to Japan due to the outbreak of the War with China 
(Taira, 1993).   12
YSB began this business is unknown.
19 The bill accepted by the IAB (commission 
was 0.25 percent, that is 1 percent per annum) and endorsed by the YSB was expected 
to be discountable as a “prime bill” on the money market (Tokyo Ginko, 1981, 380).
20 
By 1929 bills for raw cotton exported from Bombay to Osaka and bills for cotton piece 
goods exported from Japan to China and Southeast Asia could also be used as 
securities for drawing acceptance bills on New York. The outstanding amount of such 
kind of acceptance in July 1929 was $10.75 million and the acceptors were: the First 
National Bank of Boston ($2 m.), the Guaranty Trust Co. ($2 m.), the City Bank 
Farmers Trust Co. ($1.5 m.), the IAB ($1.5 m.), the New York Trust Co. ($1 m.), J. P. 
Morgan & Co. ($1 m.), the French American Banking Corp. ($0.75 m.), the National 
Shawmut Bank ($0.5 m.), and the Bank of America N.A. ($0.5 m.).
21 Of these banks 
only the Guaranty Trust Co. was included in the list on Table 7 (the First National 
Bank of Boston and the IAB are included in others on Table 7 because each bank’s 
amount of acceptance was less than $1 million in 1927). Bills of the YSB were 
accepted by many banks near New York. The amount of bills drawn against export 
bills increased from $44 m. in 1928 to $67.5 m. in 1930. However, it began to decline 
afterwards and vanished by 1934 because American bankers became cautious about 
Japanese banks after the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the Shanghai Incident of 
1932. The ratio of bills under bank credit was less than 1 percent of bills and interest 
bills bought. American banks accepted bills drawn by the YSB against export bills; but 
the ratio relative to the amount of actual export bills was very low. This circumstance 
is the same with export bills accepted by banks in London.
22 
 
Table 8 near here 
 
The New York Agency sold and paid bills and T.T.s as well as buying export 
bills and collecting import bills as shown in Table 8. Transferring money with other 
offices, especially with the London Branch, was as important as buying and collecting 
bills from the point of view of cash flow. This table also shows that discounting import 
bills was as important for the agency as borrowing money from banks at which the 
YSB had accounts, while bills drawn on American banks against export bills had 
already disappeared at this time. The New York agency functioned as a hub of the flow 
of funds within the bank on condition that New York money market was available. The 
amount of borrowings from banks is shown in Table 1 and it was very large around 
                                                        
19  MYSBA, First Series, Reel L011, No. 0319-0320. 
20 MYSBA,  First  Series, Reel L013, No. 0226-0229. 
21  MYSBA, First Series, Reel L014, No. 0909-0935. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co. 
became affiliated with the National City Bank of New York in June 1929. 
22  London banks also accepted bills drawn on them against bills against raw cotton 
exported from Bombay to Japan. MYSBA, First Series, Reel L013, No. 0258-0268.   13
1930. Discounting silk bills on the New York money market, however, was a more 
stable source of funds for the agency. The agency sold bills to the Discount 
Corporation of New York (hereafter referred to as DCNY), the Solomon Brothers and 
Hutzler (hereafter SBH), the Alexander T. Stephan Inc. (hereafter ATS), the First 
National Corp. of Boston, and other bill dealers (Yamazaki, 1988). According to a 
document titled “Acceptors” and dated 25 February 1933, which listed 140 banks in 
the United States with ratings by the SBH, the DCNY, and the ATS, the YSB obtained 
“Prime” from the SBH and the DCNY and “Prime-1/4 up” from the ATS. Out of 140 
banks 38 banks obtained three “Prime”; one bank had two “Prime” and “Prime-1/8 
up”; one bank (the YSB) had two “Prime” and “Prime-1/4 up”; and other 100 banks 
had worse ratings.
23 Moreover, out of 39 banks, which had better ratings, only seven 
were “foreign” banks.
24  The New York Agency was one of the first class banks on the 
New York money market at least in this year.
25 
  Bills accepted by banks which had good credit ratings were easily discounted 
on the money market, but trade bills were difficult to be discounted, if not impossible. 
There did not exit a custom of parceling of bills in New York as was done in London, 
so that trade bills were discounted only on their own creditworthiness. In 1921 bills for 
importing silk accepted by member banks of the Federal Reserve System were 
discounted at 4.25 percent and bills accepted by non-member banks were discounted at 
4.375 to 4.75 percent; but trade bills were not discounted except for silk bills drawn by 
the Mitsui & Co. Even bills drawn by the Mitsui & Co. were discounted only when the 
market was easy and the discount rate was 1 or 1.125 percent higher than the prime 
rate. Thus, the bank usually used trade bills as collateral for a loan from American 
banks.
26 After 1922 not only Mitsui bills but also Mitsubishi bills seem to have been 
discounted, but with the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident American banks stopped 
                                                        
23  US National Archives, RG 131.3.4, YSB Box 115. 
24  It is difficult to define a “foreign” bank. Out of seven banks five were Canadian 
banks of which head office was located in Canada; two had a intimate connection with 
a foreign bank (the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp. with the J. Henry Schröder &Co. 
and the French American Banking Corporation with the Comptoir National 
d’Escompte de Paris). Banks established by settlers in the United States such as the 
Goldman Sachs & Co. and the Heidelbach, Ickelheimer & Co. are excluded. A closer 
research may increase the number of foreign banks. 
25  There is one more similar list titled Acceptors and dated 21 October 1930 (US 
National Archives, RG 131.3.4, YSB Box 007). In this list only one rating (it is 
unknown whose rating it is) is described for each bank. The YSB obtained “Prime-1/4 
up”, while out of 159 banks, 101 banks obtained “Prime”; 9 banks had “Prime-1/8 up”; 
12 banks had “Prime-1/4 up”; and 37 banks had a worse rating. In 1930 the YSB had a 
middle class rating. In “Discountability of Bank Bills in New York Market, July 1939” 
(US National Archives, RG 131.3.4, YSB Box 031) the rating of the YSB is not listed. 
26 MYSBA,  First  Series, Reel L013, No. 0082-0086.   14
buying such trade bills (house bills). Around 1935 with less hostility towards Japanese 
banks and with the easiness of the market some banks in the West began to buy 
Japanese house bills. After the 2/26 Incident, however, the market became more 
cautious again and after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War American 
banks stopped buying these house bills. Bills accepted by the first class American 
banks were still discounted, but the amount of their credit was restricted. The activities 
of the offices of the YSB in the United States began to diminish, and their assets were 
finally frozen with the outbreak of the Pacific War (Taira, 1993). 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In the 1920s the YSB offices in London and New York bought export bills, collected 
import bills, and advised letters of credit issued by banks there in favor of merchants 
(most clients were the Japanese) exporting goods to the United State or Britain. The 
two offices transferred a large amount of money each other and with other offices 
around the world. In addition to these businesses they discounted bills on the both 
markets, borrowed a large amount of money from the first class banks there, and 
deposited money with them. These activities were correlated with one another and the 
availability of the both markets facilitated the flow of funds within the YSB. The 
internal circulation of funds changed from a system which had London as a sole center 
before the First World War to a system which had New York and London as twin 
centers. Increased significance of New York Agency reflected the growing importance 
of the New York market.   
On both markets the credibility of the bank was at least as good as those of 
other foreign agencies and better than those of other Japanese banks. The YSB was 
established under a special legislation and obtained supports from the financial 
authorities. These factors particular to the YSB seem to have generally raised the 
bank’s credit rating, and the lending of governmental funds on the London money 
market was a specific method to raise the creditworthiness of the bank. After the 
outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, however, British and American banks became 
cautious about Japanese banks including the YSB and acceptance business and bill 
discounting of the YSB on both markets began to be restricted. After the Second 
Sino-Japanese War broke out, the activities of the both offices were restricted more and 
more and they were forced to retreat from both countries in December 1941. 
The role of the Head Office to control the whole bank is not analyzed in this 
paper. The activities of the headquarters office, especially for the internal flow of funds, 
should also be studied further. Comparing the activities of the YSB in the global 
money centers with those of other Japanese banks or British Eastern Exchange Banks 
is also necessary. 
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Figure 1. Changes in the Circulation of Funds within the YSB (million yen) 
 
Sources: Ishii (1994, 12 and 17); Itoh (1989, 166). 
Note: N&SA indicates North & South America; SEA&A does Southeast Asia & Australia. 
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Figure 2. The Ratio of Telegraphic Transfers at the YSB 
 
Sources: Okurasho Ginkokyoku (1909-1934). 
 
Note: Sold equals to T.T. sold*100/(demand drafts sold+T.T. sold); Bought equals to T.T. 
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Table 1. The Outstanding Amounts of Borrowing, Discount, and Deposit of the 
YSB (million yen) 
              
    Japan  N&SA  New York Europe  London  Others Total 
Borrowing from Banks           
1911  32  3  3  8  8  0  43 
1916  140  0  0  7  7  2  150 
1921  108  0  0  0  0  6  114 
1926  100  0  0  23  23  9  133 
1931  237  71  67  50  49  0  358 
1936  194  NA  12  NA 81  NA  293 
Discount on the Market           
1911  0  0  0  31  24  0  31 
1916  0  12  12  28  25  0  41 
1921  1  62  NA 3  NA 0  66 
1926  24  93  NA 35  NA 0  152 
1931  1  63  62  13  13  0  77 
1936  209  NA  31  NA 42  NA  281 
Deposits at Banks           
1911  0  8  8  5  5  2  16 
1916  30  20  18  16  15  10  76 
1921  2  43  NA 12  NA 12  69 
1926  2  12  7  11  10  17  41 
1931  58  17  12  10  10  16  101 
1936  9  NA  5  NA 16  NA  54 
              
Sources: "Kokajo and hanki hokoku [Semi-annual reports]," MYSBA, First Series, 
Reels E009-E012; Okurasho Ginkokyoku (1911-1936). 
            
Notes: 1. Figures for New York are included in figures for N&SA (North and South 
America) and figures for London are included in figures for Europe. Figures for 
Europe include figures for the Alexandria office after 1926.  
      2. Fig ures  of depos its  at banks for New York  and London o ffices after 
1926 are figures of current deposits at banks. 
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Table 2. L/C and Letters of Instruction 
through the London Branch (₤000) 
    




L/C Issued by 





1921  10,523  177 
1922  6,133  210 
1923  5,821  482 
1924  4,656  417 
1925  4,234  312 
1926  3,943  262 
1927  1,531  178 
1928  1,495  329 
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Table 3. The Ten Largest Issuers of L/C Advised through the 
London Branch, June 1922 
  
Issuers' Name  Amount (₤)
Konig Brothers  246,790 
Colonial Bank  161,660 
Kleinwort Sons & Co.  152,480 
William Brandt's Sons & Co.  150,460 
Samuel & Co.  126,530 
Erlangers  100,000 
London Joint City & Midland Bank  97,420 
S. Japhet & Co.  64,210 
London County Westminster & Parr's Bank  56,950 
Goschen & Cunliffe  51,400 
  
Source: MYSBA, Second Series, Reel 0115, No. 0449-0545. 
  
Note: 1. Outstanding amounts in June 1922 are listed. 
        2.  Sam uel & Co. is  a private bank , which is  different 
from M. Samuel & Co. or Samuel Montagu & Co., and abandoned 
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Table 4. Large Special Acceptors    
  
Acceptors' Name  Amount (₤) 
1931   
Midland Bank, Ltd.  147,654 
Banca Commerciale Italiana  96,254 
Westminster Bank, Ltd.  56,293 
Standard Bank of South Africa, Ltd.  51,723 
National City Bank of New York  43,375 
Brown, Shipley & Co.  40,482 
Royal Bank of Scotland  39,232 
Martins Bank, Ltd.  38,755 
Lloyds Bank, Ltd.  35,185 
Commercial Bank of Australia, Ltd.  31,681 
1936   
Hambro's Bank, Ltd.  215,579 
Midland Bank, Ltd.  206,626 
Barclays Bank, Ltd.  114,183 
Westminster Bank, Ltd.  83,609 
Royal Bank of Scotland  75,930 
Barclays Bank (D. C. & O.)  72,957 
Lloyds Bank, Ltd.  52,364 
English Scottish & Australian Bank, Ltd. 43,279 
Commercial Bank of Australia, Ltd.  42,642 
Banque Belege pour l'Etranger  40,093 
  
Source: MYSBA, Second Series, Reel 0123, No. 
0573-0905; Reel 0132, No. 0576-0965. 
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Table 5. Cash Flow of the London Branch in the First Half of 1935 (₤000)   
      
Cash in  Amount Cash out  Amount 
D.D. and T.T. sold  4,249  Bills and T.T. bought  7,153 
Collecting T.T. receivable  12,526  T.T. paid  31,596 
Collecting bills receivable  16,653  Bills paid  1,550 
Collecting interest bills receivable  284  2,320 
Increase in discounting  1,244 
Pound currencies sold to the 
government   
Increase in suspense receipts  144  Decrease in fixed deposits  43 
7,000  Decrease in special deposits  832  Decrease in special deposits at 
other banks    Increase in loans  201 
Decrease in securities  1,129  230 
Decrease in bullion  248 
Increase in current deposits 
at other banks   
Total  43,477  Total  43,925 
      
Source: MYSBA, Third Series, Reel 0164, No. 0007-0028.   
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Table 6. Loans and Discounts of the London Branch, 1929 (₤) 
      
    Money at Call Money at     
 (governmental Call   
    funds)  (own funds) Bills discounted by 
Allen, Harvey & Ross  75,000  50,000  905,823 
R. W. Carter & Co.  75,000  75,000  918,228 
Alexanders Discount Co., Ltd.  50,000    38,730 
B. W. Blydenstein & Co.      50,000     
Brightwen & Co.  50,000    82,978 
Gillett Brothers Discount Co., Ltd.  50,000    143,997 
King & Foà  50,000    142,260 
Samuel Montagu & Co.  50,000     
Union Discount Co. of London, Ltd.  50,000    385,122 
Roger Cunliffe, Sons & Co.  25,000     
National Discount Co., Ltd.  25,000     
Ryder & Co.  25,000     
Smith, St. Aubyn & Co.    25,000     
Jessel, Toynbee & Co.    25,000  26,665 
Anglo-South American Bank, Ltd.      29,470 
Lyon & Tucker      18,181 
Midland Bank, Ltd.      162,441 
National Provincial Bank, Ltd.      25,000 
Total 600,000  150,000  2,878,895 
      
Source: MYSBA, First Series, Reel L014, No. 0985-1024.   
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Table 7. Issuers of L/C for Importing Silk, 1927 ($000) 
  
Name of Bankers  Amount
American Exchange Irving Trust Co.  6,235 
Equitable Trust Co. of New York  5,063 
Chase National Bank of the City of New York  4,239 
National City Bank of New York  4,033 
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York  2,813 
Brown Brothers & Co.  2,746 
Equitable Eastern Banking Corp.  2,398 
Manufacturers Trust Co.  2,394 
National Bank of Commerce in New York  1,437 




Sources: "Showa 2 nen kamihanki ni oite honten no 
toriatsukaeru beikoku muke kiito tegata ni kansuru shinyojo 
ni tsuite [On L/C advised through the Head Office for bills 
for exporting silk to the U.S. in the first half of 1927]" and 
"Showa 2 nen shimohanki ni oite honten no toriatsukaeru 
beikoku muke kiito tegata ni kansuru shinyojo ni tsuite [On 
L/C advised through the Head Office for bills for exporting 
silk to the U.S. in the second half of 1927]". US National 
Archives, RG131.3.4, YSB Box 167. 
Note: Letters of Credit advised by cable through the YSB 
head office are listed. 
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Table 8. Cash Flow of the New York Agency in the Second Half of 1936 ($ million)  
      
Cash in  Amount Cash out  Amount
Collecting and discounting  55 Export bills bought and advances  67
import bills    Money transferred to San  4
D.D. and T.T. Sold on London  25 Francisco   
Money transferred from Japan  6 Money transferred to Seattle  7
Collecting bills and T.T. from  10 Bills and T.T. bought on London  8
London    Bills and T.T. from Japan paid  11
Money transferred from other  25 Bills and T.T. from London paid  20
offices    Bills and T.T. from others paid  8
Bonds sold  3 Interest of bonds paid and bond  4
Money borrowed  6 redemption   
    Increase in current deposits with  1
    banks   
Total  130 Total  130
      
Source: MYSBA, Third Series, Reel 0168, 0253-0260.   
      
Note: D.D. indicates demand draft.     
 
 
 
 